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1 Introduction
The financing of young and highly risky companies is plagued by serious problems
of asymmetric information and incentives that make it difficult for these firms to
obtain bank loans or outside equity. In recent years venture capital firms have
developed a sophisticated set of innovative financing instruments that can be
used to mitigate these problems. In a detailed empirical study on venture capital
finance in the US Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) find that the two most common
and most important instruments are the predominant use of convertible securities
and the contingent allocation of control rights that are often separated from cash
flow rights.
A convertible security gives the VC firm the right to convert debt (or pre-
ferred stock) into equity if the portfolio company turns out to be very successful.
This gives rise to a state contingent allocation of cash flow rights. Furthermore,
venture capital contracts contain detailed provisions on the allocation of con-
trol rights. For example, even if the VC firm holds only a small fraction of the
common stock of the firm, it may still have effective control over the board,
sometimes directly through reserved seats, sometimes through a disproportion-
ate share of votes.1 Other examples include clauses that require the approval of
venture investors for asset sales or large expenditures.2 These additional rights
are typically lost upon conversion. Thus, even though the cash flow rights of the
VC firm increase with conversion, the venture capitalist may be left with less
control rights.
In this paper we want to better understand the implications of a state con-
tingent allocation of control rights. In particular, we offer an explanation for
the stylized fact that the entrepreneur/founder of the company gets the control
rights if the company is a high flyer and succeeds with an IPO, while the VC is
in control if the company is less successful and has to be either liquidated or sold
1See Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) p. 287-290. Other examples include clauses that require
the approval of venture investors for asset sales or large divestures.
2See Gompers (1999), Table 5.
1
to another company. Furthermore, we show that it may be necessary to separate
cash flow and control rights.
Our model is based on two observations: First, many entrepreneurs are
not only motivated by the monetary returns of their efforts but also by private
benefits that may accrue to them. For example, some entrepreneurs have a strong
academic background and are interested in the scientific merits of their project
even if these are of little commercial value. Some entrepreneurs feel a strong
responsibility for the environment or their home region and may be willing to
take decisions that are not optimal from a pure profit maximizing point of view.
Empirical research suggests that these benefits are large compared even with the
monetary rewards of entrepreneurship.
Second, the talents needed to invent a new business model and build a com-
pany from scratch are very different from those needed to run an established
business. In the long run it can be beneficial from a profit maximizing point of
view to replace the founder of a company by an outside manager. It is frequently
observed that entrepreneurs leave their companies after the company matured,
in particular when the company has been only moderately successful or if it has
been sold through a trade sale to another company.
Taken together these two stylized facts create a trade off as to who should
take the decision whether to replace the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur will
never own all the cash flow rights, while she enjoys all the private benefits. Hence,
she is unlikely to remove herself, even if it was efficient to do so. The venture
capitalist, on the other hand, ignores the private benefits and focuses exclusively
on the monetary payoff, when taking the replacement decision. Therefore, he
may replace the entrepreneur, even if it was efficient to let her run the company.
If the firm is unsuccessful and the entrepreneur turns out to be unsuited to
run the company, control should lie with the venture capitalist to ensure that an
outside manager is hired. If the company is doing well and the entrepreneur turns
out to be a sufficiently capable manager, the venture capitalist should relinquish
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control to prevent him from expropriating the entrepreneur's private benefits.
Often it is impossible to directly condition the control right on the state
of the world. In these cases we show that the state of the world can implicitly
be made contractible by linking control rights and cash flow rights. If properly
constructed, the equity portion of a convertible security will be worth more than
the debt part in the good state of the world, while it will be worth less in the bad
state. Even if the conversion into equity forces the venture capitalist to give up
his control rights, he may be convinced to do so by the higher value of the equity
claim in the good state. In the bad state he will prefer a fixed claim to cash flows
and thereby he keeps control. Hence, it is efficient to link cash flow and control
rights such that conversion leads simultaneously to an increase in cash flow rights
but to a decrease in control rights for the venture capitalist.
There are several other papers that deal with the use of convertible securities
in venture capital financing. Cornelli and Yosha (2003) and Repullo and Suarez
(2004) focus exclusively on the incentive properties of the conditional allocation
of cash flow rights. Berglöf (1994) considers state contingent allocation of control
rights through convertible securities and argues that they allocate control to the
party that has the highest outside option, when negotiating with a potential
buyer. Bascha and Walz (2001) argue that state contingent control rights are a
way to implement the first best decision regarding IPO's.
Focusing on cash flow rights only, Schmidt (2003) shows with a related ar-
gument that convertible debt can implement efficient effort investment, if both
the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist are important for the success of the
project. Hellmann (1998) argues that it may be optimal for the entrepreneur to
relinquish control to the venture capitalist to raise the funds necessary to start
the venture. No argument is advanced, however, why this control right is tied to
cash flow rights in the form of a convertible security.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present the
basic model. Section 3 shows that simple debt or equity contracts will in general
3
not implement the first best, while we demonstrate in section 4 that a contin-
gent control structure does. Section 5 the possibility of renegotiation. Section 6
concludes and shows that our conditional control structures can be interpreted
as a convertible security combined with a control structure that is contingent on
whether the venture capitalist exercises his conversion option.
2 The Model
Consider an entrepreneur (E) with an idea for a profitable project but no means
to finance it. The project requires an initial investment I that can be provided
by a venture capitalist (V). Both parties are risk neutral. At date 0, E proposes
a contract to V that governs their relationship. If V accepts the contract, they
invest I. If V rejects the contract, he gets a utility that is normalized to zero.
At date 1, a state of the world denoted by θ ∈ {θl, θh} is realized. With
probability q the state is θh. Then, at date 2, E chooses the size of a private
benefit b ∈ [0, b¯] that accrues to her and is non transferable. A higher private
benefit b reduces the expected monetary payoff of the project. At date 3, the party
in control of the project decides whether to replace E by an outside manager. Let
r ∈ {0, 1} be an indicator variable that takes the value r = 1 if E is replaced. At
date 4 the final uncertainty resolves and nature determines whether the project
fails and returns are zero or whether it succeeds and returns are m(b, θ) > 0. The
probability of success depends on whether the firm is run by the entrepreneur or
by the outside manager and is denoted by pE and pR, respectively.
The time structure of the model is summarized in Figure 1:
-0 1 2 3 4
Contract;
Investment I
Nature
determines
θ
E chooses
b
Party in
control chooses
r ∈ {0, 1}
Project
succeeds or fails;
Payoffs
Figure 1: Time structure of the model
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The model focusses on the choice of private benefits of control by the en-
trepreneur at date 2 and on the decision to replace her at date 3. Private benefits
of control can be substantial. In an empirical study Moscovitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002) use aggregate entrepreneurial equity return data and show that
the value of private benefits to the entrepreneur amounts to 143 percent of total
annual income. Furthermore, the entrepreneur may be willing to sacrifice ex-
pected monetary returns of the firm in order to increase her private benefits, i.e.
∂m(b,θ)
∂b
< 0. For example, she may want to invest in research projects that have
a negativ net present value but advance her status as a researcher, she may con-
sume perquisites such as a personal driver or a corporate jet, or she may employ
friends or family in the firm even though they are not best suited for the job. If
the entrepreneur is full residual claimant on the firm's profits and if she remains
in control of the firm (r = 0) she will choose b efficiently in order to maximize
pE ·m(b, θ) + b. However, if E is replaced at date 3, all the private benefits are
lost. Therefore, if replacement is anticipated, b = 0 is efficient.
At date 3 the entrepreneur can be replaced by an outside manager. We
assume that the probability of success is always higher with an outside manager
than with the entrepreneur, i.e. pR > pE. The reason is that the entrepreneur of
a young start-up company is typically not a professional manager. She came up
with the idea for the project and she built up the company but she need not be
best suited for running the company when it matures. Thus, expected monetary
returns are always higher if r = 1. On the other hand, if the entrepreneur
is replaced, she loses her private benefits of control. Hence, if private benefits
are sufficiently large, it may be more efficient not to replace E even though this
reduces the expected monetary returns of the project. We assume that in state θh
it is efficient to keep E while in state θl E should be replaced. This is summarized
in the following assumption:
Assumption 1 Let b∗(θ) = argmax{pE ·m(b, θ) + b} denote the ef-
ficient private benefit of E in state θ if E stays with the firm, while
br = 0 is efficient if E is replaced. We assume that m(b, θ) is decreas-
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ing and strictly concave in b and that b∗(θ) is unique with 0 < b∗(θ) <
b¯ ∀θ ∈ {θl, θh}. Furthermore,
pE ·m(b∗(θh), θh) + b∗(θh) > pR ·m(0, θh) (1)
and
pR ·m(0, θl) > pE ·m(b∗(θl), θl) + b∗(θl) , (2)
i.e., it is efficient to keep E in state θh and to let her consume b∗(θh)
while in state θl private benefits are too small as compared to the loss
in expected monetary returns and it is efficient to replace her.
The next assumption guarantees that it is efficient to carry out the project.
Furthermore, it requires that the expected monetary return in the high state
θh with the efficient benefit b∗(θh) is strictly larger than the expected monetary
benefit in the low state θl if E choses b = 0.
Assumption 2 If both parties behave efficiently the expected mone-
tary return of the project is sufficient to cover the investment cost,
i.e.
I < q · pEm(b∗(θh), θh) + (1− q)pRm(0, θl) . (3)
Furthermore
pRm(0, θl) ≤ pEm(b∗(θh), θh) . (4)
We can now be more specific about the feasible contracts that can be used
to govern the project. The state of the world θ and the private benefit b are
observable by both parties but not verifiable to the courts and cannot be con-
tracted upon. However, the parties can allocate control and cash flow rights. Let
C ∈ {E, V } denote who can decide whether or not to replace E at date 3, and let
v(m) denote the amount of money V gets at date 4 as a function of the monetary
return of the project. V is only interested in his monetary payoff, so his utility
function is given by
UV (m) = v(m) . (5)
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E's monetary payoff is e(m) = m − v(m). However, she also cares about her
privat benefits, so her utility function is given by
UE(m, b) = m− v(m) + b . (6)
We will first look at unconditional control structures that fix (C, v(m)) at date 0
for the entire relationship. However, the parties may also agree on a conditional
control structures such as an option contract. For example, V could be given the
option to choose at some point in time between dates 2 and 3 between control
structure (C1, v1(m)) and control structure (C2, v2(m)). We will show that such
a conditional control structure can be used to implement the first best in our
model. Therefore, we do not look at more complicated contracts. We will also
show that the conditional control structures that we consider closely resemble a
combination of a convertible security and an allocation of control rights that is
contingent on whether the venture capitalist exercises his conversion rights.
3 Debt and Equity
Let us first consider some standard unconditional control structures in order to
show that they cannot be used to implement the efficient allocation.
Suppose that the parties finance the project with equity, i.e. v(m) = αm
and e(m) = (1 − α)m. Note that because of E's wealth constraint and because
V has to break even we must have 0 < α ≤ 1. The following proposition shows
that no matter whether E is in control (C = E) or V is in control (C = V ), the
outcome is always inefficient.
Proposition 1 Any unconditional equity contract with v(m) = αm,
0 < α ≤ 1 yields an inefficient allocation:
• If the venture capitalist gets the control right (C = V ) he chooses
to replace the entrepreneur (r = 1) not only in state θl but also
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in state θh. Thus, V replaces E too often because he does not
take into account E's private benefits of control.
• If the entrepreneur gets the control right (C = E) she chooses
b > b∗(θh) in state θh. Furthermore, there exists an α < 1 such
that for all α > α she chooses r = 0 and b > b∗(θl) in state θl.
Thus, E consumes to many private benefits if she is in control.
Proof: Suppose that C = V . Note that pR > pE implies pRαm(b, θ) > pEαm(b, θ).
Thus, for all α > 0 and all states θ ∈ {θh, θl} V will replace E, which is inefficient
in state θh.
Suppose now that C = E and consider state θh. If E wants to choose r = 0
at date 3 she will choose b(α) = argmax{pE(1 − α)m(b, θh) + b}. Concavity of
m(·, θh) and α > 0 imply that b(α) > b∗ and b′(α) > 0. Furthermore, because
b∗(α) maximizes E's payoff, we must have
pE(1− α)m(b(α), θh) + b(α) > pE(1− α)m(b∗, θh) + b∗
> pR(1− α)m(0, θh) (7)
The last inequality follows from Assumption 1. Thus, in state θh E will not
remove herself (which is efficient). However, she will consume too many private
benefits.
Consider now state θl. If E removes herself at date 3, she should choose
b = 0 which yields an expected payoff of pR(1−α)m(0, θl). Note that this payoff
goes to 0 as α goes to 1. If E is anticipates that she is not going to remove
herself, she should choose b(α) = argmax{pE(1 − α)m(b, θl) + b}. Note that
pE(1 − α)m(b(α), θl) + b(α) is decreasing in α but bounded below by b¯ because
E can always guarantee herself at least b¯ by choosing b = b¯. Thus, there exists
an α < 1 such that for all α > α it must be optimal for E to choose r = 0 and
b(α) > b∗(θl), both of which is inefficient. Q.E.D.
The problem of equity with V control is that V has an incentive to replace
E in both states of the world, because he does not take into account E's private
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benefits. Equity with E control is also inefficient: In state θh E will choose
b < b∗(θh) because she enjoys the full private benefits but has to pay only fraction
(1− α) of the cost. Furthermore, in state θl, E may have an incentive to stay in
the firm because of the private benefits she enjoys, even though it would be more
efficient if she left.
Next we consider a debt contract. A debt contract requires E to make a
fixed payment D to V at date 4. Note that in our model a debt contract is an
unconditional control structure. The debt payment is due at date 4 when the
returns of the firm accrue. Thus, even if the firm goes bankrupt at date 4, all
decisions that our model focusses on have been taken already.
For simplicity we will restrict attention to the case where E can repay her
debt if the firm was successful at date 4. Clearly, if the debt cannot be repaid in
case of success, it would be even more difficult to achieve an efficient allocation
with a debt contract.
Proposition 2 Any unconditional debt contract with v(m) = D and
e(m) = m−D yields an inefficient allocation, if D is sufficiently large.
• If the venture capitalist gets the control right (C = V ) he chooses
to replace the entrepreneur (r = 1) not only in state θl but also
in state θh in order to maximize the probability that the debt is
repaid. Thus, V replaces E too often.
• If the entrepreneur gets the control right (C = E) she chooses
b = b∗(θh) in state θh which is efficient. However, in state θl she
will not choose to remove herself if
D >
pRm(0, θl)− pEm(b∗(θl), θl)− b∗(θl)
pR − pE (8)
[It remains to be shown that this is a relevant case]
Proof: Suppose C = V . V's expected payoff with a debt contract is pED if E
stays in the firm and pRD if E is replaced. Therefore, V always wants to replace
E, even in state θh which is inefficient.
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Suppose now that C = E. In state θh E will stay in the firm and choose b
efficiently because she is full residual claimant on the margin. In state θl, however,
E may have an incentive to stay in the firm even if it is more efficient to leave. If
she stays, her expected payoff is UE = pE[m(b, θl)−D]−b = pEm(b, θl)−b−pED,
so she should choose b = b∗(θl). If she is replaced by an outside manager her payoff
is UE = pR[m(b, θl) − D], so she should choose b = 0. She prefers the former
strategy to the latter iff
pE[m(b∗(θl), θl)−D] + b∗(θl) > pR[m(0, θl)−D] (9)
which is equivalent to
D >
pRm(0, θl)− pEm(b∗(θl), θl)− b∗(θl)
pR − pE . (10)
Q.E.D.
The problem with a debt contract that gives control to V is that V will
always replace E in order to maximize the probability that the debt is repaid.
If, on the other hand, control is given to E, then E may be unwilling to remove
herself but rather stay in charge and consume her private benefits. Part of the
cost from doing so is born by V who receives his debt payment with a smaller
probability if E stays in the firm.
Corollary 1 The efficient allocation cannot be implemented by any
combination of debt and equity.
Corollary 1 follows immediately from Proposition 1. Since any α > 0 induces
inefficient behavior in at least one state of the world, so does any combination of
equity and debt.
4 Contingent Control Structures
In this section we will show that a conditional control structure can be used to
implement the first best efficient allocation even if debt or equity cannot.
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Proposition 3 Consider a convertible security {(D,V ), (α,E)} which
gives V the right to choose at date 2.5 between a debt claim D with V
control and an equity claim α with E control. If D and α are chosen
such that
D =
I
pR
(11)
and
α =
pR
pE
D
m(b∗(θh), θh)
=
I
pEm(b∗(θh), θh)
< 1 (12)
then the convertible security induces E and V to behave efficiently in
both states of the world.
Proof: We first analyze the contractual choice of V at date 2.5 for any given b.
Consider first state θl. If V chooses debt with V control, he will replace E at date 3
and his expected payoff is UV (D,V ) = pR ·D. If he chooses equity and E control,
then E will choose r = 1 if and only if pR(1− α)m(b, θl) > pE(1− α)m(b, θl) + b
which is equivalent to
α <
(pR − pE)m(b, θl)− b
(pR − pE)m(b, θl) < 1 (13)
If α is below this threshold, her profit share is sufficiently high that she will
voluntary remove herself. In this case, V's expected payoff is pRαm(b, θl). If
however, α is above the threshold, E's profit share is so small that she would
rather not replace herself but consume b. In this case, V's expected payoff is
UV (α,E) = pEαm(b, θl) < pRαm(b, θl). Thus, V will always choose debt with V
control if
pRαm(b, θl) ≤ pRD = pRp
E
pR
αm(b∗(θh), θh) (14)
which is equivalent to
pRm(b, θl) ≤ pEm(b∗(θh), θh) (15)
which holds by Assumption 2.
Consider now state θh. We first show that in equilibrium V will choose (α,E)
if and only if b ≤ b∗. Note first that if V chooses (D,V ), he will always replace E
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at date 3 in order to increase the probability that the debt is repaid. Thus, his
expected payoff is pRD. Second, if V chooses equity and E control, E will choose
r = 0 which is efficient. Furthermore, V's expected payoff pEαm(b, θh) is strictly
increasing in b. Thus, by the construction of α we get that pRD ≤ pEαm(b, θh)
if and only if b ≤ b∗(θh). Thus, V will choose equity with E control if and only if
E does not consume more than the efficient private benefits.
Now we analyze the optimal choice of b by E. Consider state θl first. E
anticipates that V will always go for debt with V control and that he will replace
her at date 3. Therefore, it is optimal for her to choose b = 0.
Consider now state θh. E anticipates that V will choose equity and E control
if and only if b ≤ b∗(θh) in which case she will stay on in the company and can
consume her private benefits.
If she chooses b > b∗(θh), V will choose (D,V ) and replace her at date 3.
Thus her expected payoff in this case is
UE(b > b∗(θh)) = pR · [m(b, θh)−D] (16)
which is strictly decreasing in b. Because of the constraint b > b∗(θh) E maximizes
over an open set and there is no optimal value for b. However, the payoff that
can be obtained with b > b∗(θh) is bounded above by
supUE(b > b∗(θh)) = lim
b→b∗
pR · [m(b, θh)−D] = pR · [m(b∗(θh), θh)−D] . (17)
On the other hand, if she chooses b ≤ b∗(θh) V will opt for (α,E) and E will not
be replaced. In this case her expected payoff is
UE(b) = pE(1− α)m(b, θh) + b . (18)
In this case she would like to choose b∗(α) > b∗(θh) but she is constrained by
b ≤ b∗(θ).
Thus, E will choose b = b∗(θh) if and only if
UE(b∗(θh)) = pE(1− α)m(b∗(θh), θh) + b∗(θh)
≥ pR · [m(b∗(θh), θh)−D] = supUE(b > b∗(θh)). (19)
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Substituting α = p
R
pE
D
m(b∗(θh),θh) this is equivalent to
pE
(
1− p
R
pE
D
m(b∗(θh), θh)
)
m(b∗(θh), θh)+b∗(θh) ≥ pR · [m(b∗(θh), θh)−D] (20)
which is equivalent to
pEm(b∗(θh), θh) + b∗(θh) ≥ pRm(b∗(θh), θh) (21)
which holds by Assumption 1.
Thus, we have shown that in the good state V will choose (α,E) if and only
if E chooses b ≤ b∗(θh) and that this induces E to choose b = b∗(θh), which is
efficient.
It remains to be shown that α < 1. Note that Assumption 2 implies that
I < pEm(b∗(θh), θh). Thus,
α <
pEm(b∗(θh), θh)
pEm(b∗(θh), θh)
= 1 . (22)
Finally, we have to show that V recovers his investment cost I. In the bad
state he gets pRD. In the good state he gets pEαm(b∗(θh), θh) = pRD. Thus, his
expected payoff is
qprD + (1− q)prD = prD = pR I
pr
= I (23)
so he just breaks even. Q.E.D.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is as follows. At date 2.5 V has to decide
whether to take a debt claim and have control at date 3 or whether to have an
equity claim and give control to E. In the bad state, the equity claim is worth
little and V prefers to replace E in order to get the fixed payment D with a higher
probability. Consider now the good state. D and α have been chosen such that
V prefers equity over debt if and only if E chose b ≤ b∗(θh). E anticipates that if
she chooses b > b∗(θh), V will take debt with V control and replace her at date
3. Therefore, she will resist the temptation to consume to many private benefits
and chooses b = bh(θ) which is efficient.
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Note thatD and α have been chosen such that V just breaks even. He prefers
the debt claim in the bad state where he receives pRD. He prefers the equity claim
in the good state where his expected payoff is pEαm(b ∗ (θh), θh) = pRD. Thus,
his overall expected payoff is given by
UV = qpRD + (1− q)pRD − I = pR I
pR
− I = 0 .
Thus, any efficient project that satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 can be financed by
using a contingent control structure.
5 Renegotiation
In this section we consider the possibility that the parties renegotiate the initial
contract during their relationship. Their is an incentive to renegotiate the original
contract whenever there is scope for an efficiency improvement. If the contract
of Proposition 3 is in place, this cannot happen on the equilibrium path, because
the contract implements an efficient allocation in all states of the world. It may,
however, occur off the equilibrium path state θh. To see this suppose that E
chooses b > b∗. In this case V is induced to choose (D,V ) and to replace E which
would be inefficient. Therefore E may offer to increase α in order to induce V to
choose (α,E) and not to replace her. The following proposition shows, however,
that E can never gain from choosing b > b∗.
Proposition 4 The contract of Proposition 3 implements the first
best, even if renegotiation is feasible at any point in time.
Proof: First, note that under convertible financing there is no scope for renegoti-
ations on the equilibrium path, because the first-best is implemented. In the bad
state there cannot be renegotiation off the equilibrium path either. Suppose E
chooses b > 0, then V would still choose (D,V ), which is efficient. Thus, E has
no incentive to deviate.
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If E chooses b > b∗ in the good state, V prefers (D,V ) over (α,E). But
if he would choose (D,V ) he would not replace E, which would be inefficient.
Therefore, E could to increase α in order to induce V to behave efficiently. We
have to distinguish two cases.
• D ≤ m(bˆ, θh): In this case V can secure himself pRD, the same as on
the equilibrium path, by sticking to (D,V ). Because the total surplus is
reduced by deviating from b∗ that leaves less for E than on the equilibrium
path. Therefore, it does not pay off for E do deviate.
• D > m(bˆ, θh): In this case E the company would have to declare bankruptcy
and the whole monetary payoff goes to V. Therefore, even offering α = 1
will not induce V to relinquish control because he gets m(bˆ, θh) with the
higher probability pR if he keeps his control right.. Q.E.D.
6 Conclusion
The contingent control structure that we used in Section 4 can be interpreted
as a convertible security combined with a shift in control rights if the conversion
option is exercised. For example, in the initial contract the venture capitalist
could be given convertible debt or convertible preferred stock and in addition
control rights over the company including the right to replace the entrepreneur.
However, these control rights are lost if the venture capitalist chooses to convert
his debt claim into equity. In this case, the entrepreneur receives full control.
The venture capitalist will exercise his conversion option only if the firm is highly
successful. Furthermore, the entrepreneur wants him to exercise his conversion
option in order to receive the control over the company. Therefore, she is willing
to consume not to many private benefits in order not to reduce the monetary
value of the firm too much.
On the other hand, if the bad state of the world materializes, it it is not
15
profitable for V to exercise his option. Therefore he will remain in control and
replace E, which is efficient.
It interesting to note that cash flow rights and control rights move in opposite
directions here. If V does not exercise his conversion option, he holds a debt
claim, but he is assigned the control right to remove E. If V exercises his option,
he holds equity. Nevertheless, the control rights are now passed to E. This is just
the opposite of standard debt and equity. With standard debt, the debt holder
has no control rights as long as the debtor is not in default, while the traditional
equity holders have all the residual rights of control in a company.
Such a separation of cash flow rights and control rights is often observed in
venture capital finance.
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